Quote:They could have not. First they would have to break trough the Siegfried Line, and Britain did not have the troops needed to participate in September 1939.
Britain did not even care the least.
Quote:What the entire French Army was lacking was the a clear idea of how such an attack would be carried out.
Nya-nya. The French Army had plans for assault as well as many other plans - it's common for militaries to have plans for all sorts of things. However, the French leadership did not want to attack Germany. The soldiers were specifically "avoiding provocation" and simply drinking wine on the front lines, waiting for the government to settle matters with Germany. The problem is, the French didn't even take action.
At least, they did not do what they promised. At Franco-Polish negotiations of 14-19 may 1939, France promised Poland in case of Hitlerite agression "to start a main total offensive on Germany on the 15th day of mobilisation". The Anglo-Polish negotiations of 23-30 may 1939 resulted in Britain assuring Poland that it would lend 1300 war planes for the Polish Air Force and bomb Germany immediately in case of a war.
None of this was done, obviously.
At Saarbrucken, the French painted giant posters "We will not make the first shot in this war!". On many border posts the French and German soldiers visited each other, exchanged food and drinks!
The French Northen Front against Germany had the following ratios: manpower 3,2:1, artillery 2:1, tanks - 2850 to none, aviation (including the British AF) 1,8:1. The Germans would be utterly smashed, but... the French just didn't want to take any "provocative" action.
On 12 September the French stopped all actions on the Franco-German border due to "fast development of events in Poland". After Poland collapsed, they felt everything's okay and can be settled without much problem. The 12 September decision in Abville effectively ended any hopes of offensive against Germany; the promises made to Poland before were forgotten with a wave of the hand. The betrayal was complete.
Churchill himself noted after the war: "Munich and a whole lot of other actions have totally convinced the Soviet government that neither Britain nor France would fight unless assaulted directly, and even in that case there'd be little use of both of them".
Jodl said:
Jodl wrote:... we could never, neither in 1938 nor in 1939, hold out against an all-out assault of these countries [France and Britain]. And if we were not defeated in 1939, it was only due to the fact that 110 Franco-British divisions on our border during the war with Poland against our 23 divisions remained completely inactive.
Quote:Before you start talking about imperialism you are free to look at the Soviet Union's actions before 1941.
You evaded the point. Beforehand, Britain and France
consciously rejected Soviet proposals. Since there's little you can do in the face of this fact, you proceed to evade the point by speaking of USSR's later actions. Where's your point about the rejection of Soviet common action proposals? Oh right, there's none.
On 12th September 1938 Chamberlain said the following:
"Germany and Britain are the two pillars of the European world and main strongholds against communism, and therefore our current difficulties should be resolved by peaceful means ... It is certain that a solution could be found that would satisfy everyone - except Russia".17 April, 1939 Moscow proposed a Britain-France-USSR treaty for mutual aid with the following proposals:
Quote:"1. Britain, France and the USSR sign a treaty for 5-10 years for mutual aid, including military aid, in case of an agression against any of the states in Europe.
2. Britain, France and the USSR take on obligations to offer all aid, including military aid, to Eastern Europe states between the Baltic and Black seas bordering on the USSR, in case of an agression against those states.
3. Britain, France and the USSR take on obligations to settle the extent of the military aid provided by each of the states in the execution of #1 and #2.
4. The British government explains to the Polish government that the aid promised only takes into account German agression.
5. The Romano-Polish pact is proclaimed active in case of any agression against these states, or dismissed entirely as directed against the USSR.
6. Britain, France and the USSR take on obligations after the eruption of hostilities to make no negotiations and peace treaties with agressors separately and without the agreement of all three participants.
7. A treaty is signed according to the convention produced according to #3.
8. Acknowledge the need for Britain, France and the USSR to make collective negotiations with Turkey on the matters of a special mutual aid agreement."
But on 26 April 1939 Lord Halifax claimed "it's not the time for such a
wide proposal". Instead, Britain and France tried to obtain a one-way deed-poll from the USSR. On the Ministers Cabinet, 3 May 1939 Lord Halifax said he would query Russia:
Quote:... whether it would agree to make a one-way declaration, that it would provide all help, which would be acceptable to Poland and Romania
Only on 25-26 July the governments decided to start negotiations. However, the negotiations started on 12 August turned out to be a foolish farce - the French delegation with general Dumenc had no rights to sign any treaty whatsoever, and the English delegation didn't have any written authorities at all!
The instruction sent out from Britain to the delegation stated that "the negotiations have to be conducted quite slowly" and that the:
Quote:The British government does not wish to take on any obligation whatsoever that could tie our hands in any way. Therefore, in a treaty we have to pursue the most general and vague phraseology.
The rest is history.
Quote:You clearly haven't heard of the British Expeditionary Force.
No, I have. The problem was it's
inaction. How did it happen that the Germans took action against France well a few month after the Polish campaign, and not the other way round? Phony war is also a fact, and there's no room for wiggling there.