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[NLR article] PETER GOWAN - NEOLIBERAL COSMOPOLITANISM

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PETER GOWANNEOLIBERAL COSMOPOLITANISM
Over the past decade a strong ideological current has gained prominence in the Anglo-American world, running parallel to the discourse of globalization and rhetorically complementing it. Indeed, in official parlance it is the more insistent of the two, and seems likely to become all the more clamorous in the aftermath of September 11th 2001. We may call it the new liberal cosmopolitanism, as distinct from the more democratic cosmopolitanism defended here by Daniele Archibugi. [1] Its theorists are for the most part to be found in international relations departments of the Anglophone universities, though some have been seconded to offices of the UN Secretariat or NATO protectorate in Bosnia. [2] Viewed historically, the new doctrine is a radicalization of the Anglo-American tradition that has conceived itself as upholding a liberal internationalism, based on visions of a single human race peacefully united by free trade and common legal norms, led by states featuring civic liberties and representative institutions. Such liberal internationalism sought to create a global order that could enforce a code of conduct on the external relations between states. But it still essentially accepted the Westphalian system that granted states jurisdiction over their own territories.

The new liberal cosmopolitanism, by contrast, seeks to overcome the limits of national sovereignty by constructing a global order that will govern important political as well as economic aspects of both the internal and external behaviour of states. This is not a conception advocating any world government empowered to decide the great international issues of the day. Rather, it proposes a set of disciplinary regimes—characteristically dubbed, in the oleaginous jargon of the period, ‘global governance’—reaching deep into the economic, social and political life of the states subject to it, while safeguarding international flows of finance and trade. In this system, sovereignty is reconceived as a partial and conditional licence, granted by the ‘international community’, which can be withdrawn should any state fail to meet the domestic or foreign standards laid down by the requirements of liberal governance. [3]

Significant ideological shifts are always in some measure responses to changes in the real world. The new liberal cosmopolitanism is no exception. Its theories have arisen against the background of a whole set of new pressures on the internal organization of weaker states, and new patterns of interaction among stronger ones. Victory in the Cold War has made it easier for the Western powers to dispense with client dictatorships that were once loyal allies in the battle against Communism, and to proclaim liberal democracy a general value, to be upheld even in less favoured parts of the world. Domestic economic law and property relations have been steadily realigned, across continents, to harmonize with directives of the IMF, WTO or relays at regional level. States outside the rich core have been remarkably ready to make such internal, ‘behind the border’ changes. Strategically, the collapse of the USSR has not led to any revival of major conflicts between the Western powers, but on the contrary to a reinforcement of what Michael Doyle extols as the ‘Pacific Union’ of our day—the military alliance that fought the Gulf War, launched the attack on Yugoslavia and, at the time of writing, appears to be gearing up for an onslaught in West Asia. The multiplication of UN military missions involving the major powers tell the same story. The theorists of the new liberal cosmopolitanism (henceforward NLC) are on firm ground in pointing to all these developments as a sea change in international relations. When, however, they attempt to explain them, we quickly enter the realm of apologetic euphemism.

Mapping global dominance
Crucial to the NLC version of today’s world is the claim, not just that the ‘Pacific Union’ has remained united, but that its members have broken with power politics as their governing impulse. What this, of course, represses is the central fact of contemporary international relations: one single member of the Pacific Union—the United States—has acquired absolute military dominance over every other state or combination of states on the entire planet, a development without precedent in world history. The US government, moreover, has shown no sign whatever that it is ready to relinquish its global dominance. American defence spending, as high today as it was in the early 1980s, is increasing, and a consensus across the Clinton and Bush administrations has developed in favour of scrapping the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The underlying reality of the Pacific Union is a set of bilateral, hub-and-spokes military alliances under US leadership. In the past liberal theorists usually explained the forging of these alliances as responses to powerful Communist and Soviet threats to democratic values and regimes. Yet, though liberalism and democracy are now widely held to be a prevailing norm, and the Warsaw Pact has vanished, these ‘defensive’ alliances have not quit the stage. On the contrary, Washington has worked vigorously to reorganize and expand them during the 1990s.

NLC theorists protest that the United States has, nevertheless, abandoned egoistic national interest as its strategic guideline. After all, are not liberal democratic values tirelessly lauded and expounded in the speeches of US leaders—most imperishably, by the late President Clinton? Such declarations are no novelty—ringing proclamations of disinterested liberal principle go back to the days of classical nineteenth-century power politics and Lord Palmerston. If, on the other hand, we turn to actual policy guidelines for US diplomacy in the 1990s, we find them wholly dedicated to the calculations of power politics. [4] Where such documents refer to the icons of free trade and liberal democracy, they are presented as conditions for the advancement of US power and prosperity.

Do these power-political instruments and orientations at least exempt other members of the Pacific Union from the calculus of domination? By no means. Hegemonic military alliances have two faces—one external and one internal: the first directed against potential enemies, the second serving to keep auxiliaries in line. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary-General of NATO, expressed this duality with crystal clarity when he famously remarked in the 1950s that the purpose of NATO was keep the Russians out and the Germans down. The same dual objective has remained at the centre of American Grand Strategy for the post-Cold War epoch—witness the Pentagon’s forthright injunction, in a document leaked to the New York Times early in 1992, that the US ‘discourage the advanced industrialized nations from even aspiring to a larger global or regional role’. [5] Conventional apologias for the American-led war against Yugoslavia as a disinterested rescue mission for human rights, free of any power-political consideration, ignore the regimenting function of the Balkan intervention within NATO itself—the demonstration effect on European allies of overwhelming US military might in their own borderlands, consolidating the unequal structure of the Atlantic Pact internally. [6]

In these respects, realist accounts of the nineties are clearly superior to the prospectuses of the new liberal cosmopolitans. Zbigniew Brzezinski has summed up the actual nature of Doyle’s Pacific Union with characteristic bluntness, remarking that compared to the British Empire of the nineteenth century,

the scope and pervasiveness of American global power today are unique . . . Its military legions are firmly perched on the western and eastern extremities of Eurasia, and they also control the Persian Gulf. American vassals and tributaries, some yearning to be embraced by even more formal ties to Washington, dot the entire Eurasian continent. [7]
Brzezinski offers us a map of ‘US geopolitical preponderance and other areas of US political influence’. The whole of Western Europe, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, as well as some parts of the Middle East and Canada fall into the category of US ‘preponderance’—not just influence. The main zones with the resource capacities to challenge US hegemony are precisely those where the US has most firmly established its political sway.

Brzezinski’s map also indicates the large parts of the planet which are of little strategic interest to the US. There can, of course, be objections to Brzezinski’s selection of areas of vital concern and areas of relative neglect, marked as it is by his own geopolitical preoccupations—others might wish to emphasize a more ‘geo-economic’ pattern of power-projection, with greater priority accorded to the most important centres of capital accumulation or natural resources (above all petroleum). Yet such a stress would also reveal a highly selective focus (and one that scarcely differed from Brzezinski’s). Although the United States and other Pacific Union governments publicly stress the need for the global spread of liberal rights and regimes, their policies actually obey a double derogation. In ‘strategic backwaters’, such as most of sub-Saharan Africa today, even real genocide can be casually covered or countenanced, as the experience of Rwanda has shown. Where delinquent states are pivotal to American strategic interests, on the other hand, they are vigilantly shielded from human rights pressures, as the cases of Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey or Indonesia, to name only the most flagrant examples, have long made clear.

World institutions
Any form of liberal cosmopolitan project for a new world order requires the subordination of all states to some form of supra-state planetary authority. NLC occlusion of the role of the US in the Pacific Union is compounded by a misrepresentation of the relationship between the US and the various institutions of ‘global governance’ that are either in place or being canvassed. There is no evidence that these institutions have strengthened their jurisdiction over the dominant power in the international system. If anything, the evidence of the 1990s suggests a trend in the opposite direction, as most of these organizations are able to function effectively only insofar as they correspond to the perceived policy priorities of the United States, or at least do not contradict them; indeed, in many instances they should rather be viewed as lightly disguised instruments of US policy.

The United Nations is a striking case in point. With the end of the Cold War, the US has been able to utilize the UN for its ends in a style not seen even in the days of the Korean War. The expedition of Desert Storm in 1991, followed by a decade of sanctions against Iraq, in which UN ‘inspection missions’ have been openly colonized by the CIA, and the Balkan War, whose violation of the UN Charter was rewarded with the promotion of NATO to UN subcontractor, have only been the most prominent examples of the submission of the Security Council to American dictates. The Secretary-General holds office only at US pleasure. When Boutros-Ghali proved insufficiently malleable—‘unable to understand the importance of cooperation with the world’s first power’ in the words of White House factotum James Rubin—he was summarily removed in favour of an American placeman, Kofi Annan, who regularly makes public assertions of the need for the UN to cater to the pre-eminence of Washington at which Trygve Lie himself would have blushed. None of this, of course, has meant that the US feels it necessary even to pay its dues to the UN. In similar spirit, the United States has set up a War Crimes Tribunal under the UN label to punish those it views as its enemies in the Balkans, and protect those it deems its friends, while at the same time declining to sign up to an international court of Human Rights, on the grounds that members of its own armed services might unseasonably be charged before it, or too visibly given special exemption from legal sanction under the escape clause carefully crafted for the US in the treaty.

If we turn to international financial institutions, the pattern is even starker. The IMF is so completely an agency of American will that when the Mexican debt crisis struck in 1995, the Treasury in Washington did not even bother to consult European or Japanese members of the Fund, but—in brazen contravention of its Charter—simply instructed the IMF overnight to bail out American bond-holders, while appropriating additional funds, not even tenuously at its disposal, from the Bank of International Settlements in Basle for the same purpose. The East Asian crisis of 1997–8 offers further evidence, if it were needed, of the ability of the US Treasury to use the IMF as an instrument of its unilateralism, most flagrantly and coercively in the South Korean case. The latest arrival in the panoply of ‘global governance’, the World Trade Organization, repeats the pattern.

Ratification of the WTO Treaty was explicitly made conditional upon the WTO proving ‘fair’ to US interests, which since the late 1980s has always meant an unabashed rejection of any rule deemed ‘unfair’ to those interests—an approach the impeccably orthodox economist Jagdish Bhagwati has called ‘aggressive unilateralism’. Bhagwati highlights the creation and use of so-called Super 301 and Special 301 laws, but to these could be added ‘anti-dumping’ provisions and countervailing duties. Such measures have been far from marginal in US international economic policy: as Miles Kahler points out, ‘the number of actions brought against “unfair” trading practices increased dramatically’ during the 1990s. [8] According to another authority, ‘no other economic regulatory programme took on such an increase in case-loads’. [9] Alongside this refusal to be bound by cosmopolitan economic law, meanwhile, there have been vigorous attempts to extend the jurisdictional reach of US domestic law internationally, applying it to non-American corporations operating outside the United States, in the notorious Helms–Burton pursuit of foreign firms trading with Cuba.

In short, the reality is an asymmetrical pattern of change in the field of state sovereignty: a marked tendency towards its erosion in the bulk of states in the international system, accompanied by an accumulation of exceptional prerogatives on the part of one state. We must, in other words, make a sharp distinction between the members of the Pacific Union: the United States has not exhibited any discernible tendency either to abandon power politics or to subordinate itself to supra-state global authorities. Expressions of official enthusiasm for norm-based cosmopolitanism as an institutionalized order, although by no means wanting in Washington (the majority of NLC theorists are, after all, American), have been more profuse on the other side of the Atlantic. During the 1990s, as the European Union committed itself to developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and prepared for enlargement to the East in the wake of NATO expansion, it started to lay ever greater emphasis on applying its ideological and legal regimes to external partner states. Today, the EU regularly outdoes the US itself in lecturing other states on the inseparability of the free market from the rule of law and democratic government, and in posing as guardian of universal liberal principles. In practice, however, it has consistently acted as a regional subordinate of the US, save where narrow trade, investment and production interests are concerned—still liable to spark contention at a lower level.

The various West European states would all prefer the US to proceed with less unilateralism. But their conception of what passes for ‘multi-lateral’—essentially a matter of style rather than substance—remains sufficiently minimal not to present any threat to American hegemony. At no period since the end of the Second World War has Western Europe been so closely aligned, ideologically and politically, with the United States as today. The anxiety with which the incoming Bush administration was greeted in European capitals was a sign of dependence rather than distance. The days of Adenauer and De Gaulle, or even Edward Heath and Helmut Schmidt, are long past.

Trade regimes
Let us counter-factually suppose, however, that the allies of the United States could inveigle it into a more collegial form of Pacific Union dominance. Is there any evidence that such a configuration would usher in a liberal cosmopolitan order subordinating the sovereignty of national states to universalist liberal norms and institutions, applied equally to all? To answer this question, we need to ask: what are the social and economic transformations that are now jointly promoted by the Pacific Union, and how do these affect the international system of states? The theorists of NLC present the fundamental changes under way as, firstly, steady progress towards a global free market, subject to negotiated regulation, and secondly, the spread of liberal democracy across the earth, unifying the peoples of the world in representative government, monitored by global institutions protecting human rights. These are large claims. Let us begin by looking at the economic prospectus held out by NLC.

The common notion, taken more or less for granted by NLC theorists, that the companies of Pacific Union states inaugurated economic globalization by escaping the control of their own states ignores the fact that the patterns of international economic exchange have continued to be shaped in large measure by state diplomacy, establishing the legal and institutional framework for the operation of markets. NLC doctrine tends to assume that the regulatory and market-shaping impulses of states have been and are geared towards liberal free-trade regimes. Contemporary evidence suggests that this is misleading: the drift of the international economic policy of core countries in the 1990s has been marked by resistance to free-trade principles in sectors of critical importance to economies outside the core—agricultural products, steel, textiles and apparel—and by moves towards managed trade and ‘reciprocity’ in a number of others. Examples include various key aspects of US–Japanese trade, where the total range of imports or exports to be achieved in various sectors is specified in advance; the use of Voluntary Export Restraints, pricing agreements and other non-tariff barriers by the EU to control the level of imports from Eastern Europe; and so-called ‘rules of origin’ designed to exclude from free entry into a given market goods produced with varying amounts of inputs from third countries. The effect of such protectionist and mercantilist methods is, typically, to generate chronic trade and current account deficits on the part of less developed countries—a near universal problem facing East European states—exacerbating already huge debts, and making peripheral governments increasingly desperate to gain supposedly compensating inflows of capital from the core states. This is a pattern that all too often renders them vulnerable and unstable, hence incapable of generating sustained improvement in the well-being of their populations.

Furthermore, the bulk of the economic changes made in the 1990s did not concern international trade at all. Although described in the Western media as ‘trade regimes’ or ‘trade negotiations’, they have been overwhelmingly about the property rights of foreign capitals in other states: that is, the ability of foreign operators to gain ownership of domestic assets, or establish businesses within states on the same terms as domestic companies, to move money in and out of the country freely, and to enforce monopoly rents on intellectual property. The public-policy issues raised in these areas concern such matters as the costs and benefits of allowing global oligopolies to gain ownership of domestic assets and integrate them into their profit streams; of ending controls on the free movement of private finance; of privatizing (mainly into foreign ownership) domestic social-service provisions and utilities; and last, but by no means least, the costs and benefits of making domestic financial systems—and thereby entire national economies—highly vulnerable to sudden and massive gyrations in global monetary relations and in international financial markets.

Current trends in international trade and in the internal transformations of non-core political economies are thus very far from guaranteeing virtuous circles of cosmopolitan economic and social gains for the world’s populations. There is overwhelming evidence of a huge and growing polarization of wealth between the immiserated bulk of humanity and extremely wealthy social groups within the core countries. Neither is there the slightest indication that, were its allies within the Pacific Union to subordinate the US to a more collegial system, this pattern of economic relations would alter in any way. Indeed, one of the main bases for perceptions of common cause between the US and its allies is precisely their joint interest in perpetuating this drive for control of new profit streams from non-core economies.

Permeable sovereignty
NLC theorists confuse juridical forms with social substance. They depict the world as a fragmented system of state sovereignties on one side, and a proliferating number of regional, international and global regimes and institutions on the other. In the midst of these institutional patterns they perceive a swelling mass of individuals, increasingly free to maximize their welfare in markets. This juridical perspective provides the basis for hoping that global regimes can encase state sovereignties in a legally egalitarian, cosmopolitan rule of law in which citizens of the world can unite in free exchange. If, however, we view this same international order from the angle of social power, it looks more like a highly centralized pyramid of capitalist market forces dominated by the Pacific Union states and strongly supported by their state officials. This reality is captured by Justin Rosenberg’s notion of an ‘empire of civil society.’ [10] In this empire, we find substantial unity between the states and market forces of the core countries, rather than the antagonism suggested by theorists of globalization and liberal cosmopolitanism. We also find substantial unity across the societies of the Pacific Union, whose empire is guarded not by any supra-state authority, but by a single hegemon.

We do not have ready to hand a language for describing this pattern of global social power. We are used to thinking of both state sovereignty and international markets as the opposites of imperialism. This could be said to have been true of the various European colonialisms of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, for these were largely juridical empires claiming sovereign legal power over conquered territories and peoples. But the distinctive feature of the Pax Americana has been the enlargement of US social control within the framework of an international order of juridically sovereign states. Samuel Huntington has provided the classic statement of how US imperial expansion has worked:

Western Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and much of South Asia, the Middle East and Africa fell within what was euphemistically referred to as ‘the Free World’, and what was, in fact, a security zone. The governments within this zone found it in their interest: a) to accept an explicit or implicit guarantee by Washington of the independence of their country and, in some cases, the authority of the government; b) to permit access to their country to a variety of US governmental and non-governmental organizations pursuing goals which those organizations considered important . . . The great bulk of the countries of Europe and the Third World found the advantages of transnational access to outweigh the costs of attempting to stop it. [11]
During most of the Cold War, as Huntington notes, the principal lever of US expansion was the security pact. Since the beginning of the 1980s a second instrument has supplemented it: financial and market-access pacts for states facing financial crisis. These pacts not only allow entry of Atlantic capitals into lesser sovereign states; they also allow national and international market structures to be redesigned so as to favour systematically the market dominance of Atlantic multinational corporations. In liberal thought, the rejection by the dominant core states of formalized legal authority over territory can seem to suggest a far weaker form of political power than the European juridical empires of old. This is because liberal approaches often tend to conceive power as ‘command’. But he who takes legal command over a territory assumes responsibility for everything that happens on it—frequently a heavy burden and potentially a dangerous one. On the other hand, he who shapes the relevant environment of a given state authority can ensure that it acts in ways conducive to his interests. The emergent global system is geared to shaping the environments of sovereign states so that developments within them broadly match the interests of the Pacific Union—while responsibility for tackling these developments falls squarely on the governments of the sovereign states concerned. This new type of international order, then, does not make the system of penetrated sovereign states a legal fiction. They remain crucial cornerstones of the world order, but their role becomes above all that of maintaining political control over the populations within their jurisdiction.

Domestic liberalization
The second principal basis for NLC optimism lies in the spread of liberal democratic forms of polity across the globe. Yet, paradoxically, severe pressures on the foundations of many newly liberal-democratic states have come from the very Pacific Union seen by liberal cosmopolitans as the fount of international harmony. States are forced to open their economies to monetary and financial movements to which the employment conditions of their citizens become extremely vulnerable. Their elites are encouraged to impose policies which widen the gap between rich and poor. Economically weak countries are driven to compete for the entry of foreign capital by reducing taxes on the business classes—thereby undermining their capacity to maintain social and educational services. All these pressures have been taking their toll: as Geoffrey Hawthorn has noted, states under strain or in disintegration, the emergence of shadow states or outright state collapse are becoming common sights in the contemporary world. In such conditions liberal girders burst, and groups will often increasingly turn to organized crime or break with the homogenizing national political values of the state, demanding exit as national minorities.

These trends are not confined to polities outside the Pacific Union. They are also reflected in a general malaise within the ‘consolidated’ liberal democracies of the core, well captured by Philippe Schmitter:

Privatization of public enterprises; removal of state regulations; liberalization of financial flows; conversion of political demands into claims based on rights; replacement of collective entitlements by individual contributions; sacralization of property rights; downsizing of public bureaucracies and emoluments; discrediting of ‘politicians’ in favour of ‘entrepreneurs’; enhancement of the power of ‘neutral technical’ institutions, like central banks, at the expense of ‘biased political’ ones—all these modifications have two features in common: 1) they diminish popular expectations from public choices, and 2) they make it harder to assemble majorities to overcome the resistance of minorities, especially well-entrenched and privileged ones.
Schmitter goes on to note the decline in democratic participation in those advanced liberal democracies ‘most exposed to the “more liberalism” strategy’, commenting:

whether this process of ‘dedemocratization’ can continue is, of course, the all-important question. Its justification rests almost exclusively on the superior economic performance that is supposed to accrue to a liberalized system of production and distribution—along with the deliberate effort to foster a strong normative rejection of politics as such. [12]
Finally, of course, NLC theorists welcome military intervention at large by the Pacific Union in the name of human rights—or even ‘civilization’—as an inspiring step forward towards the realization of a world ruled by liberal principles rather than power. On closer inspection, however, these expeditions offer a model of power-projection that virtually inverts this description. When constitutional polities descend into civil war, liberal procedures collapse—as liberal theory acknowledges, allowing for emergency situations when liberal norms are suspended. Typically, in such crisis conditions, both sides to a political conflict will accuse the other of violating provisions of the law, which becomes a largely rhetorical token in a struggle over other issues, such as separatism, irredentism, or confessional division. During the 1990s, states of the Pacific Union intervened in several such conflicts, proclaiming the need to uphold liberal norms, while taking no political position on the issues that have caused them. The NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999, lauded by NLC theorists as a triumph of humanitarian principle, should rather be seen as an example of politically unprincipled, arbitrary imperial government. The conflict between the Yugoslav government and the Kosovar Albanians concerned the right of the latter to secede from Yugoslavia. The Pacific Union states in effect declared this political issue irrelevant and themselves incapable of laying down any general principle to resolve it, resorting instead to an arbitrary ‘pragmatism’ that seems set to repeat itself in any such future operations. The revenge attacks being planned in the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Centre seem unlikely to be aimed at mitigating the tensions racking Saudi Arabian society—home to the majority of the hijackers—whose extraordinarily repressive confessional regime has, as noted, long been smiled upon by the Pacific Union.

For even if the Pacific Union states were to overcome all tensions amongst themselves and merge into a minority condominium over the planet, there is every reason to suppose that they would continue to place contradictory demands upon the system over which they currently preside. On the one hand, they demand internal arrangements within those states which suit the interests of the ‘empire of civil society’. But on the other they rely upon those states to preserve domestic order and control their local populations. These incompatible policy requirements stem from an essentially arbitrary attitude towards enforcing universalist liberal norms of individual rights. The evidence mustered by the supporters of the new liberal cosmopolitanism to claim that humanity is finally on the verge of being united in a single, just world order is not convincing. The liberal-individualist analytical corset does not fit the world as it is: it fails to strap American power into its prognosis of a supra-state order. The cosmopolitan project for unifying humanity through the agency of the dominant capitalist states—on the normative basis that we are all individual global citizens with liberal rights—will not work: it is more likely to plunge the planet into increasingly divisive turmoil.

There is another version of cosmopolitanism abroad today, which places at the centre of its conception of a new world order the notion of a democratic global polity. This comes in a number of different editions, some scarcely distinguishable from liberal cosmopolitanism save for more voluble democratic piety. But in its most generous version, exemplified by Daniele Archibugi’s essay in these pages, this is a programme with the great merit of seeking to subordinate the rich minority of states and social groups to the will of a global majority, in conditions where the bulk of the world’s population remains trapped in poverty and powerlessness. Yet even its best proposals suffer from two crippling weaknesses. They focus too narrowly on purely political institutions, while ignoring the fact that a Herculean popular agency would be required to realize even these against the united colours of the Pacific Union. Any prospect of bringing humanity towards genuine unity on a global scale would have to confront the social and economic relations of actually existing capitalism with a clarity and trenchancy from which most representatives of this current shrink; and any hope of altering these can only be nullified by evasion or edulcoration of the realities of the sole superpower. Timothy Brennan has criticized the self-deceptions of a complacent cosmopolitanism of any stripe. The best antidote to them comes from clear-minded advocates of the present order itself. As Robert Kagan and William Kristol wrote, with tonic accuracy, in the National Interest (Spring 2000):

Today’s international system is built not around a balance of power but around American hegemony. The international financial institutions were fashioned by Americans and serve American intersts. The international security structures are chiefly a collection of American-led alliances. What Americans like to call international ‘norms’ are really reflections of American and West European principles. Since today’s relatively benevolent circumstances are the product of our hegemonic influence, any lessening of that influence will allow others to play a larger part in shaping the world to suit their needs . . . American hegemony, then, must be actively maintained, just as it was actively obtained.
In other words, US power will not come to an end until it is actively detained. No scheme for universal harmony, however long-term, is credible if it tries to sidestep it.



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[1] See ‘Cosmopolitical Democracy’, NLR 4; and the subsequent discussions of it in Geoffrey Hawthorn, ‘Running the World through Windows’, NLR 5; David Chandler, ‘International Justice’, NLR 6; Timothy Brennan, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism’, NLR 7. I will return to the relations between ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ versions at the end of this article.
[2] For leading statements of this current, see Michael Doyle, ‘A Liberal View: Preserving and Expanding the Liberal Pacific Union’, in T. V. Paul and John Hall, eds, International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge 1999 and Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Summer/Fall 1983; see also Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces and the Future of World Politics, Glenview, IL 1988; James Rosenau, ‘Citizenship in a Changing Global Order’, in Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds, Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge 1992; Larry Diamond, ‘The Globalization of Democracy’, in Ray Kiely and Phil Marfleet, eds, Globalization and the Third World, London 1998; Paul Taylor, ‘The United Nations in the 1990s: Proactive Cosmopolitanism and the Issue of Sovereignty’, Political Studies, 47, 1999, pp. 538–65; Richard Falk, Positive Prescriptions for the Near Future, Princeton Center for International Studies, Paper No. 20, 1991. Doyle has served as an observer in Bosnia, Falk as a consultant to Annan.
[3] Paul Taylor, ‘The United Nations in the 1990s’.
[4] See, for example, The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC 1998.
[5] This was the 1992 Draft of the Pentagon Defense Planning Guidance.
[6] See ‘The Twisted Road to Kosovo’, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, Special issue, May 1999.
[7] See Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York 1997, p. 23.
[8] Miles Kahler, Regional Futures and Transatlantic Economic Relations, New York 1995, p. 46.
[9] Pietro Nivola, Regulating Unfair Trade, Washington, DC 1993, p. 21.
[10] Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society, Verso: London and New York 1995.
[11] Samuel Huntington, ‘Transnational Organizations in World Politics’, World Politics, vol. 25, no. 3, 1973, p. 344.
[12] Philippe Schmitter, ‘Democracy’s Future: More Liberal, Preliberal or Postliberal?’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 6, no. 1, January 1995.

New Left Review 11, September-October 2001

Pdf: http://users.skynet.be/bk335835/NLR24505.pdf
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