A History of the Iraqi Communist Party 1934-1963: Part 3
By "Comrade Mudarisov"
After Fahd’s arrest in the late 1940s the ICP fell into a sharp decline, since many of its members were arrested and many cells broken up. This showed how the party relied on strong leadership, rather than building a strong base. Nevertheless, by 1950 the party had managed to rebuild itself under the leadership of Baha’uddin Nuri. This chapter shall examine the eight years prior to the Iraqi revolution. Firstly, this chapter will look at the leadership of Baha’uddin Nuri and his rebuilding of the party, followed by the leadership of Hamid Uthman, and the rise of leftist radicalism in the party. The leadership of these two men also sees a more prominent role played in the party by Kurds (both men were Kurdish), and this will be looked at in a separate section on membership. Finally, we shall look at the policies of the ICP under Hussain ar-Radi (Salam ‘Adil), who was responsible for re-unifying the party, joining the National Unity Front in 1957 and leading the party into the 1958 revolution. While looking at the leadership of these three men, we shall also examine the events that took place while they were at the helm, which will show us the distinct changes in ICP policy that occurred during the 1950s.
The Rebuilding of the Party Under Baha’uddin Nuri
Baha’uddin was born in a village, near the city of Sulimaniyah in Northern Iraq. He was the son of a religious teacher. He had not experienced the underground life that Fahd had, but nonetheless he had an unquestioning faith in the future of communism. After the arrest of Fahd in 1947 and his execution in 1949 the party was in ruins. Many in the underground had been arrested, and those who managed to evade arrest worked individually rather than through cells, as had been the case in previous years. By late July 1949, however, the central committee had re-emerged under the leadership of the twenty-two year old Baha’uddin. Messages began to circulating by longhand and by November a new internal journal had been established. By February 1950 the old party newspaper, al-Qaida, had been revived. Simultaneously, a policy of ‘orderly retreat’ was announced as a campaign to rebuild the party. This campaign advocated the re-application of all members of the party, including those who had served with Fahd, as well as a new probationary period. During the same period, the Iraqi legation in Moscow claimed that two hundred young Iraqis had arrived in Moscow for ‘purposes of systematic training in insurrectionary practice’. Batatu argues that the revival of the party and the arrival in Moscow of two hundred so-called communists is no coincidence.
At the same time there was an increase in party propaganda, the steadiest flow being directed to hired labourers. In 1951 a workers’ union was established by the ICP without permission from the government, which organised workers and led to some minor uprisings and riots, such as Habbaniyah and the tribal revolts in ‘Amarah in August 1952. These revolts were just the beginning of a wider revolt, which was to engulf Baghdad and was to have many repercussions within the political establishment.
The Intifada of 1952
The Intifada can be compared to the wathba of 1948, in the sense that little had changed in the preceding years except for the loss of Palestine, which further increased resentment towards the government. The Intifada resulted from an accumulation of factors, such as popular discontent and the frustrations of ordinary Iraqis at their conditions. The government’s decision to postpone the 1952 parliamentary elections united all the discontented parties, such as the Independents, the United Popular Front, the National Democrats and the Partisans of Peace (a Communist front organisation). All these groups except the Partisans of Peace sought a peaceful solution to the conflict; however, the regent was unwilling to go back on his decision on the elections. Thus, on 22nd November 1952 protests began in Baghdad and were joined by those workers who were already on a non-political strike. According to Batatu, a police report for that day stated that arms had to be used to quell the protests. This action merely aggravated the situation, and led to the resignation of the then Prime Minister Mustafa al-Umari, as the riots were reaching their peak. Al-Umari’s resignation emboldened the protestors and, according to the British embassy, was a mistake because it ‘gave the impression that the Communists and fellow- travellers were strong enough to overturn Governments.’ The following day saw a further increase in agitation. The organisation of the demonstration was led by the Communists who became increasingly visible. While the leaders of the other opposition parties watched events from afar, the ICP were prominent. The Communists were responsible for the storming of a police station and the burning of the United States Information Service library. The scale of the demonstrations led the government to appoint General Nur ud-din Mahmud as head of the government, who promptly declared martial law, dissolved all opposition parties, and arrested all their leaders. But the Communist party remained intact, although the main instigator, its leadership had remained invisible during the protests. Thus despite Mahmud’s attempts, the protests continued and took a more violent form. On the 24th November troops fired on protestors killing eighteen and wounding eighty-four. The result of the protests had had an affect on the army, where many officers saw the political and social discontent of the population. In addition, their defeat in Palestine and the Revolution in Egypt in 1952 led them to set up a ‘Supreme Committee of Free Officers’ similar to the one established in Egypt. The seeds of revolution were sown.
The result of the protests for the ICP was a radicalisation of the party. In March 1953 a new charter was published calling for a ‘People’s Democratic Republic representing the will of the workers, peasants, and popular masses.’ This provoked a heated party debate and led to a split within the party mainly led by members from Irbil and Sulimaniyah who claimed that the charter was ‘belittling the role of the liberal bourgeoisie, and attempting to skip the stage of national liberation.’ They wanted a gradual approach to revolution and resented the party being dominated by the central committee in Baghdad. Despite the split, the rise of the far left continued unabated partly due to the arrest of Baha’uddin. However, he believed that the split had been caused by ‘inexperienced leftist deviationists.’ This brought the even more radical Hamid Uthman to the head of the central committee.
Radicalisation under Hamid Uthman
Hamid Uthman was an inexperienced leader, who threw the ICP into senseless and costly encounters with the police by calling for ‘a general political strike’, ‘armed struggle’, and ‘a people’s revolutionary army.’ He was greatly influenced by the ideas of Mao Zedong, and on many occasions Uthman emphasised the relevance of the Chinese Communist experience. It must be noted that Iraq’s social conditions were nothing like China’s in this period. Despite Uthman’s enthusiasm, his policy aims were unrealistic and these policies isolated the party from other opposition parties, and thus Uthman’s policies and tactics led to defeat for the party and his inevitable downfall.
The Baghdad Pact
The Baghdad Pact, of 1955, was seen by the ICP as a direct threat to communism as a whole and ‘directly threatened the international proletarian cause…the interests of the working class and popular masses.’ In addition, from behind the scenes Nuri as-Said issued repressive decrees against suspected communists by revoking their nationality and exiling them. This greatly affected the party, since it was the hardened and unrepentant communists who bore the brunt of these decrees. Moreover, many ordinary Iraqis believed that the pact perpetuated an undesired connection with the British, and guaranteed them the privileges they had hitherto enjoyed, but also caused a split within the Arab world, and an alignment in the Cold War, thus alienating neutralist, nationalist, and pan-Arab opinion. Consequently, all opposition parties formed a ‘National Front’, which contested the parliamentary elections in the June 1954 elections and won eleven seats out of a one hundred and thirty-five seat assembly. The lack of seats was due to the two-tier voting system, where the electorate would vote for representatives who would then vote by proxy for members of parliament. However, the parliament was dissolved only one month after being elected and even more repressive measures were being taken by the government against any opposition. This resulted in Hamid Uthman’s decision to take action against the government. He repeatedly ordered his followers onto the streets and encouraging them to erect barricades and burn police posts. Unlike the wathba of 1948 or the Intifada of 1952, the people in Baghdad were extremely passive on this occasion. Conditions had deteriorated in the preceding years leading to apathy. Too many protests had not improved the quality of life for Iraqis. Also, no other parties joined the protests thus limiting numbers on the street. In addition, the opposition parties had been paralysed by the repressive measures taken by Nuri as-Said. According to the US ambassador in Iraq at the time, ‘daily clashes between the police and the communists so disrupted the Communist party that in less than a year it became impossible for it to carry on a co-ordinated campaign against the government.’ By mid-January 1955 the party confessed that it had been mistaken in its tactics and put it down to inexperience in the political field. It made an appeal to the other parties to resist the Baghdad Pact, but this appeal fell on deaf ears. In this instance the government appeared victorious over the communists. This also brought about the downfall of Hamid Uthman and the rise of a moderate camp led by Salam 'Adil.
The re-unification of the Party and the establishemt of the National Unity Front
The removal of Hamid Uthman came about when members of the party confiscated the party’s printing press from him, and handed absolute power to Salam ‘Adil, since he now had control of the party’s publications. He was to remain as head of the central committee until his death in 1963. Having come to power, ‘Adil initiated a peace with those communists who had split with Hamid Uthman, and as a result the ICP was reunited with all factions merging. This reunification saw the emergence of three strongmen within the party: Salam ‘Adil, ‘Amer ‘Abdallah, and Jamal al-Haidari. The Soviet Union now placed more emphasis on the ‘national liberation’ movements. Slogans claiming that, ‘Kurdish and Arab interests are not incompatible with one another’ became popular within the ICP, thus uniting the Arab and Kurdish branches of the party. In addition, the rise of Nasser in Egypt and his increased leaning to the USSR prompted the ICP to come out in favour of his policies and ideas on pan-Arabism, although this was to change after the revolution when the ICP supported Qassem over ‘Arif in the split between pro-union and anti-union Iraqis.
Following the Suez Crisis in 1956, the ICP was once again presented with an opportunity to show its strength and attack the government. Although demonstrations in Baghdad were severely repressed, the party managed to gain support in Najaf, as most of the central committee had a connection with Najaf, either by living there or being related to some of the ulema there, thus being able to mobilise local support more easily. The mobilisation of support on the streets had provoked a harsh reaction from the government in which many people were killed. The ICP’s intention, however, was to have a peaceful. This only served to increase ill feeling in the city, and led to many police officers fleeing the city. The unrest in Najaf spread to nearby Hayy where demonstrators took up arms under the leadership of the ICP and managed to take over much of the town. Only an army brigade managed to stop them taking over the seat of the local governor. These two uprisings proved to the ICP that the government would only fall if events took place in Baghdad, which the party was unable to do. Nonetheless, the demonstrations had made the Iraqi government’s position less firm than ever, which led to the revolution of July 1958.
Following the Najaf and Hayy demonstrations, the ICP approached the other parties with a view to forming a National Front. The NDP were willing to ally with the ICP, but the Independents still had qualms about mixing themselves up with the communists. However, the imposition of martial law and the increase in repression undertaken by Nuri as-Said gave momentum to the idea of a National Front. Thus, in February 1957 the ICP, the NDP, the Ba‘ath and the Independents united to form the National Unity Front. It called for the removal of Nuri as-Said’s government, withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, the forging of common policies with the liberated Arab countries (a reference to Egypt and Syria), the abolition of martial law and the establishemt of democratic and constitutional freedoms. In addition, the NUF also built a link with recently established ‘Supreme Committee of Free Officers’, thus unifying both civilian and military opposition to the monarchy for the first time.
Membership (Part Two)
In order to see the extent of the party’s influence in society one must look at the composition of membership. Below are three tables, one dealing with ethnic composition, religious composition and class composition. What these tables hope to show is the type of people attracted to the ICP, their ethnicities, religious sect and class. In addition to examining the make up of the party, these tables will also show us trends that were taking place in the 1950s. These trends will be discussed in more depth when we look at each individual table. The tables are also interlinked together, for example, ethnic composition in the 1949-1953 central committee sees four Kurds, and at the same time the table for class composition indicates that there were four working class members of the central committee in the same period. These are the Kurdish members, and were the result of the policies of Baha’uddin Nuri, which, again, we shall discuss in depth when looking at the tables more closely.
Table of Ethnic Composition 1949-1958
Kurds Arabs
1949-1953 4 6
1953-1955 3 9
1956-1958 4 13
In the preceding chapter we have spoken about the ascendancy of the Kurds in the party. Although, the weight in numbers belonged to the Arabs, the Kurds constituted the real axis of the party. This is the case between 1949 and 1955. The Kurds provided all the general secretaries in this period, and accounted for as high as 31.3% of the overall membership, which was a great leap from the 4.5% they had enjoyed in Fahd’s time. From 1955 onwards, we see a huge leap in Arab members, and a sharp decline in Kurdish membership. This is due to the undoing of Hamid Uthman, and the rise of Salam ‘Adil. At the same time, a meeting between the Soviets, the Arab Communists and Arab nationalists, which produced an agreement to oppose the Baghdad pact, led to the party to take more interest in Arab affairs, and thus lead to the rise of Arab membership. This also led to the party’s support of Gamal Abdul-Nasser in Egypt, which again may have encouraged many proto-Arab nationalists to join with or publicly support the ICP.
Table of Religious Composition 1949-1958
Sunnis Shi’ites Jews Christians Others
1949-1953 5 5 1 0 0
1953-1955 6 6 0 1 0
1956-1958 11 5 1 1 0
The Period 1949-1955 saw the rise of the Shi’ite Arabs into a numerical dominance. In the years 1941-1948, Shi’ite Arabs constituted 20.5% of the party. In 1949-1955 this rises to 46.9%. This is important because the Shi’ites constituted 44.9% of Iraq’s total population in 1951 , and thus they were under represented in the ICP. This period sees a sharp decline in non-Muslim minorities. The representation of Christians decreased from 22.7% in 1941-1948 to 3.1% in 1949-1955. Jewish representation decreased from 9.1% to 3.1% and others from 4.5% to nil. There are a number of explanations for this sharp decline in non-Muslims. In 1948 many of the ICP’s leadership were behind bars. After the execution of Fahd the underground collapsed, as did the party. Thus, it was at the initiative of the Kurds that the party was rebuilt, and so this was to determine the make up of the new cadre. Jewish representation dropped due to the mass exodus of Jews from Iraq to Israel in the early 1950. However, non-Muslims in this period played a very minor role in the ICP.
Table of Class Composition 1949-1958
Peasant Class Working Class Lower Middle Class Middle Class Upper Middle Class Upper Class
1949-1953 1 4 4 0 0 0
1953-1955 1 2 6 0 1 1
1956-1958 3 0 6 3 2 2
The table on class composition has been included because it is important to see the backgrounds of party members as well as their individual make up. The period 1949-1955 sees a large increase in working class members. This is due to the policies of Baha’uddin Nuri and Hamid Uthman, who believed that by accepting more working class members the party would become ideologically stronger. This resulted, however, in many inexperienced people being put in high party positions, thus creating policies that were disastrous for the party (see above). The lower middle classes (i.e. the petty bourgeoisie) remained strong throughout the period 1949-1958. This has always been the case of the party. Although, there were in 1956-1958 two members of the upper class in the central committee, it may not be true to state that the party generally attracted such classes. On the other hand, the party was making an effort to recruit in the rural areas, and thus we see an increase in the numbers of those belonging to the peasant classes being recruited into the party. The drop in working class members can be attributed to the fact that many in the ICP were those who had been members during Fahd’s time. Thus, there were hardly any new members in the central committee.
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