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Dugin and his influence on the KPRF

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Soviet cogitations: 820
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 28 Jan 2008, 19:10
Ideology: Marxism-Leninism
Komsomol
Post 28 Jul 2020, 00:19
I was chatting with a Russian about how Dugin has had such a wide influence across the Russian political spectrum writing the platform for the KPRF, co-founding the NazBols and influencing Putinism. And he said it was overplayed in the West and he was very skeptical about Dugin writing the KPRF platform even though it was on wikipedia. I looked on google books and found a few vague references. So then I went to the KRPF website and searched for Dugin. And there wasn't much reference to him. But then I found this article from 1992 which was interesting in itself. And I was surprised that a footnote to it acknowledged as much-

This article was first published in the newspaper "Soviet Russia" in 1992 under the pseudonym Leonid Okhotin and later became the basis of the ideological platform of the revived Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov.

https://kprf.ru/personal/dugin/ideas/19455.html

The tragedy of Russian communism
A. Dugin
1992-05-08 04:00
I. 10 fatal mistakes.
The catastrophe, the collapse of the party and the country's complete rejection of socialism cannot be attributed solely to the betrayal of "agents of influence" in the higher echelons of the CP. There were also internal, ideological reasons for the defeat. Without their analysis, the revival of the party, the revival of the social justice regime in the country is impossible. The restored party should not be purely "restorationist", "nostalgic" and "archaic". It must clearly understand the complete inadequacy of some of its previous ideological, political and geopolitical positions. Let's try to highlight the fundamental reasons that led to the crisis and the collapse of not only the socialist system, but also the great Eurasian power.

1) KP was unable to respond to the challenge of History. This means that the ideologists of the party (starting from a certain moment) could not or did not want to give a proper ideological and philosophical answer to the changing situation in the world, could not or did not want to take into account the historical experience of the party itself, could not or did not want to go beyond the framework of archaic dogmatism which has long ceased to correspond to socio-political reality. The origins of the "falling asleep" of party thought should be sought in Khrushchev's times, when, at the philosophical level, the communist philosophy of the Hegelian (and therefore state and centralist) orientation was gradually replaced by Kantianism under the guise of Marxism, which implicitly led to the domination of an individualist, anti-collectivist and anti-state approach. Under Brezhnev, there was not a single party thinker or ideologist at all. By the time of perestroika, not a single communist, except for the dissidents who fled to the west (for example, Zinoviev), could articulate and coherently explain the ideological essence of their views. Yeltsin, who chuckled in America at the "vague chimera of communism," giggled at his own ignorance, at his ideological ignorance.

2) The CP was unable to formulate ideologically the fact of its internal transformation into a party of national orientation. The transformation of the CP in the 30s from the party of the World Revolution to the Party of the Great Eurasian State was not reflected in the party doctrine. National Bolshevism that existed and flourished in practice did not have any dogmatic expressions in ideology. This, in particular, allowed the country's enemies to accuse the communists of the "sin of internationalism" that had not existed in practice for many years.

3) Since the Khrushchev era, the Communist Party began to actively use "humanistic" and "democratic" rhetoric, incompatible with the socialist ideology of which the party was de facto. This gave rise to doublethink and hypocrisy in the culture, ideology and political education of the people. Instead of Stalinist realism (sometimes cynical and cruel, but always quite frank), an atmosphere of deceit, corruption and a latent orientation toward the West reigned in society. So there was a gradual surrender of ideological positions to the enemy.

4) The CP made of foreign policy and geopolitical issues the property of the classified structures of the KGB, the General Staff and Special Departments, in the bosom of which, invisibly to the people and the party itself, destructive, subversive, liquidationist geopolitical projects could ripen (and matured), whose meaning, just by virtue of secrecy was not understood for a long time, neither the people nor the communists. This attitude to ordinary communists and the people as to idiots, from whom geopolitical projects and the logic of international politics must be hidden, led to the alienation of the party from the nation. By the way, such an attitude was never characteristic of the early communists up to Stalin, who clearly and unambiguously told the people who was friend and who was enemy, and explained why. Although international reality could change, nevertheless, its general principles in general terms were then clear to everyone.

5) The KP, following the "subversive" projects of the extremist Khrushchev, was unable to stop the process of "deprivatization" and pressure on small producers, although it was already obvious from the end of the 50s that the introduction of certain elements of small-scale private (or even more so communal, cooperative) production is inevitable. By this, it was the KP that facilitated the creation of shadow structures of the economy, which from visible and subject to control turned into clan mafia organizations. With the weakening of control from the top and corruption of law enforcement agencies, this could not but lead to economic collapse. Archaism in the socialist economy not only did not contribute to its stability, but inevitably led to its collapse.

6) KP, having abandoned the "anthropological pessimism" natural for the East (that is, the attitude towards a person as an imperfect creature and in need of correction on the part of socio-religious structures), characteristic of all traditional societies of Eastern Eurasia, both theocratic and secular , changed the logic of the state and social history of Russian society. Brezhnev's slogan "everything for man, everything in the name of man" was not only deceitful, but also treacherous in relation to the age-old social foundations of Russia. In the political context of the modern world and in the conventions of modern political science jargon, it is obvious to everyone today that the slogan "man" is opposed to the slogan "people"; the protection of "human rights" is always based on the infringement of the "rights of the people", and vice versa, " correspond to reality, the most important is the fundamental anthropological approach, which is the basis of social ideology. "Humanism" and "anthropological optimism" characteristic of the West and Western society are completely unacceptable for the society of the East. To think otherwise is to fall into a historical utopia and an unreasonable surreal abstraction. To think otherwise is to deny the entire history of the East and its social characteristics. correspond to reality, the most important is the fundamental anthropological approach, which is the basis of social ideology. "Humanism" and "anthropological optimism" characteristic of the West and Western society are completely unacceptable for the society of the East. To think otherwise is to fall into a historical utopia and an unreasonable surreal abstraction. To think otherwise is to deny the entire history of the East and its social characteristics.

7) The CP, gravitating internally to a special form of popular religiosity, to communal ethics and Eurasian statehood, continued to insist on atheism, proletarian class orientation and internationalism, which gave rise to a deep contradiction between reality and slogans. The real alliance of the party elite with the church hierarchy remained a mystery for society with seven seals until the moment when the discovery of this fact could only lead to discrediting the Church. This, in particular, averted many potential allies and sincere believers from both communism and the Russian Orthodox Church, pushing some towards sectarianism and schism (TOC, ROC abroad, etc.), and others towards solidarity with Russophobic anti-patriotic and anti-socialist religious movements oriented towards the geopolitical and ideological West. Morality, confessed in a socialist state, gradually, after the eschatological excesses of early communism, came into line with national traditional norms. There is practically nothing specifically and abstractly "communist" left in it. On the contrary, in many respects the moral atmosphere of socialism was more archaic (in a positive sense) and "more religious" than the capitalist period of the nominally monarchical and Orthodox Russian State before the revolution. And finally, from the class point of view, the Party was not so much a proletarian as a national one, and the messianic Marxist thesis about the proletariat turned into a glorification of the ethics of Labor, Creation and Service to the Fatherland, equally applicable to all segments of the population. The dogmas of party education, asserting its atheism, "proletarianism"

The CP, masking the principle of elitism inherent in the system of party selection of leading cadres and being ashamed to openly admit the practice of high-quality selection for leadership positions, has generated nepotism and corruption in the party hierarchy. The principle of selecting the very best has been replaced by the principle of selecting the most devoted or even the most compromised. Among other things, many talented and capable elite cadres were thrown into the camp of dissidents, repressed, or simply squandered their talent on the lower levels of the social, political and apparatus hierarchy.

9) The CP made all ideological and intellectual activity the occupation of an unknown shadow referent, supplying nominal rulers with projects, the logic of the construction of which remained a secret for the highest functionaries themselves. In a critical situation of confrontation, the ideology of the party ended up in the hands of people who were absolutely incompetent to respond to any counterargument from essentially anti-socialist elements. Lenin and Stalin were well versed in the intricacies of world history and diplomatic intricacies. Both of them were also clearly aware (this does not mean that they have always spoken openly) the fundamental ontological, historical and social principles on which the ideology of their party was based. In the present situation, the party can only nominate honest functionaries, statesmen, business executives, or hysterical hysterics.

10) The KP constantly clung to the “idea of ​​unidirectional progress,” which has become obsolete and exposed today as a harmful utopia, thereby denying the reality of the cyclism of history. In this regard, the question of building socialism in one country and the Stalinist concept of a socialist state marked a rejection of the orthodox Marxist concept of the Permanent Revolution, which was especially vividly manifested by Trotsky, which believed that history was moving in only one direction. Stalin admitted de facto that the social history of states is a cyclical process, and it was on this that the geopolitical continuity of the USSR and the Great Russian Empire was based. Marx, and later Trotsky, insisted on the withering away of the state. Stalin, on the other hand, strengthened, exalted and made the powerful and huge Russian State, not only without bringing its end closer, but having laid the foundation for the Eurasian Power, much larger than the territory of the Russian Empire in the most favorable times. "Progress" and the superstitions associated with it revived again in the days of Khrushchev. This fact alone indicates the viciousness and "subversive nature" of this pernicious idea, which is a relic of the naive mechanistic theories of the Enlightenment, most of which have long been successfully refuted by science. Putting all these points together, we can say that the main fundamental mistake of the KP is that it chose the path of ideological compromise with a completely alien "bourgeois-humanist" ideology and phraseology and categorically refused to call things by their proper names. KP was one, but posed as something completely different. It was the Eurasian Party of the hard eastern type, which in fact put the interests of the nation and the people above the interests of a private individual, an individual. It was the Party of East and Social Justice, opposing the imperialist interests of the West, primarily the United States, and the Anglo-Saxon world as a whole. It was the Party that defended the primacy of communal interests and collective ethics over the egoism of the market "economic man" of capitalism. It was a Party that was toughly pursuing the geopolitical interests of Russia, expanding and strengthening the Great State, sacrificing its blood, its life, its best people for this. Gradually, from the original Marxism and faceless proletarian internationalism, the Party passed to the National Bolshevik archetype, which embodied the modern energies of Russian ancient history and Russian social traditions. "Internationalism" (as cosmopolitanism) of the first Bolsheviks gradually turned into Russian Eurasian imperial super-nationalism, and Marx's universalist utopias became an expression of the desire of a particular great nation and a particular state for power, strength and prosperity. As for the price paid for building the most powerful state, despite its cruelty and exorbitantness, one must not forget that everything Great requires the offering of gigantic sacrifices, blood, suffering, heroic deeds and terrible, inhuman efforts. This is a historical constant. Perhaps the most fatal for the Party turned out to be its Russian nature, which hardly gets along with analytical thinking and, on the contrary, gravitates toward intuitive knowledge. If it were not for this "distrust of the human, all too human mind" (fraught with both brilliant metaphysical insights,

II. 10 amendments that will be lifesaving.

In the current conditions of the temporary victory of the anti-popular factor in the state and the ephemeral triumph of anti-national ideology, despite all the multitude of political, cultural and ideological forces of the popular, national opposition - from neo-monarchists to neo-communists, there are only real chances for a political, ideological and geopolitical victory the restored Communist Party, despite all its discreditedness in the eyes of public opinion. This public opinion is the product of a very external mental hypnosis, which, although it can act for some time, nevertheless, its power can never and under no circumstances be compared with the power of the archetypes of the collective unconscious of a nation. But it is precisely the collective unconscious that is the organ with which the people "think", which he feels and in accordance with which he makes historically defining decisions. The hypnosis of "bourgeois-democratic" demagogues has the strongest effect on insignificant strata of residents of large cities, in which elements of cultural, national or religious confusion most often dominate. It is such people who are endowed with the weakest contact with the collective unconscious, which, in fact, is a sign of a deep mental deviation. It will not be an exaggeration to say that in our Eurasian, Russian conditions, a "democrat" can be either a foreigner or a mentally ill person. Therefore, in the event of the revival of the former Communist Party as the force that it was not in words but in deeds, the people will certainly see in it the embodiment of their own ideological need, their own voice. But for this Renaissance it is necessary to take into account the causes of the KP disaster. The restored Party must become the vanguard in the battle for the establishment of National, Social and Geopolitical Justice throughout the Soviet Union, grossly violated by destructive, subversive processes unleashed by anti-socialist, Russophobic, anti-patriotic imperialist forces through their "agents of influence" in the USSR from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. The restored party must correct the hypocritical and demagogic slogans that do not correspond in the slightest degree to its essence. Namely, it is necessary to discard: grossly violated by destructive, subversive processes unleashed by anti-socialist, Russophobic, anti-patriotic imperialist forces through their "agents of influence" in the USSR from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. The restored party must correct the hypocritical and demagogic slogans that do not correspond in the slightest degree to its essence. Namely, it is necessary to discard: grossly violated by destructive, subversive processes unleashed by anti-socialist, Russophobic, anti-patriotic imperialist forces through their "agents of influence" in the USSR from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. The restored party must correct the hypocritical and demagogic slogans that do not correspond in the slightest degree to its essence. Namely, it is necessary to discard:

1) dogmatism, ideological archaism and nostalgic restorationism (one must boldly look history in the face);

2) a superficial and formal approach to solving national problems (it is necessary to provide all Soviet peoples with a maximum of cultural, religious, economic, industrial, commercial and linguistic autonomy, limiting only military, political and geopolitical autonomy);

3) demagogic "humanism" and "democracy" (having approved in its place the concept of "anagogic totalitarianism", that is, a hierarchical and centralized society that embodies the path of ethical, spiritual and qualitative improvement on its floors);

4) secrecy in relation to the most important geopolitical, diplomatic and international projects (which will allow the people to follow and believe with their intuition the course of political leadership in radical historical issues (for example, if the Afghan war were not a secret war, if its geopolitical, strategic and anti -imperialist goals would have been explained to the nation, it would have been won long ago));

5) pseudo-socialist dogmatism of relatively small cooperative and even private producers and owners, as well as various forms of corporate and artel management (which will allow the elements of the market to exist under control over the observance of economic justice);

6) the rhetoric of "human rights" and "anthropological optimism" of slogans (since a human being, especially a human being of our cyclical period, certainly needs a radical and harsh "correction" both in the ethical and religious spheres (this does not contradict no religion);

7) atheism and anti-religious rhetoric (closing the possibility of spiritual perspective in the bosom of "anagogic totalitarianism" and depriving all Eurasian imperialism of a higher, transcendental perspective);

egalitarianism and the idea of ​​high-quality individual equality of people (since people can be equal and should be equal only in the face of some higher superhuman Principle - in the face of God, History, Nation, State, Community, Truth, etc.);

9) delegation of the most important ideological, political and geopolitical decisions to the shadow referent (which means that it is necessary to treat your people as a thinking people, understanding and making decisions, i.e., as a people actively involved in the management of the state and fully participating in the conscious and volitional creation of History);

10) the "dogma of progress" (which does not stand up to any test of scientific data and is a simple relic of the naive "enlightenment optimism" of the 18th - 19th centuries).

The party, of course, must carry out a powerful purge in its ranks in order to sweep out from there all the "subversive" elements that have the stain of betrayal, liquidationism, collaboration with the "bourgeois-democratic" clique of the interim occupation government, in the service of the imperialist bankocracy. The party must affirm its doctrinal continuity of the National-Bolshevik Ideology, which received the fullest development among the Russian Smenovekhists (Ustryalov and others), the Eurasians (Trubetskoy, Savitsky, Vernadsky, etc.) and German conservative revolutionaries (from Arthur Müller van den Bruck to early Ernst Jünger, Ernst von Zalomon and Ernst Nikisch). The party should strive for a complete seizure of power in the USSR, and further towards becoming an ideological continental structure, the Party of the Eurasian East, i.e. to the creation on its basis of the New Continental Bloc, which alone in the modern world can ensure real strategic and environmental security within Europe and Asia. Geopolitical perspectives of the Party should be coordinated with the concept of the European national revolutionary Jean Thiriard with his prophetic thesis about the historical necessity of creating in the future a single "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin". The party must necessarily be patriotically oriented. Moreover, it must integrate, on a free and voluntary basis, all ideological flanks of the patriotic movement - from patriotic monarchists to patriotic democrats. This integration is necessary not only from the point of view of the tactical unification of all national forces, but as a touchstone of genuine, effective and adequate ideological synthesis, which forms the basis of the revived Party. Sectarianism, pseudo-orthodoxy, personal ambition and dogmatism in our situation are synonymous with betrayal of the historical interests of the people and the state. The party should not be a product of a mechanical combination of all existing movements and parties of a patriotic orientation, it should become a spiritual and intellectual integration, a clear crystal expression of the people's will, based on the deep instincts of our imperial ethnos - from its metaphysical and religious self-manifestations to the voice of the archetypes of the collective unconscious. If all of the above conditions are met and all the necessary conclusions are drawn, the revived Party not only has a chance of winning, it is doomed to Victory, despite all the temporary schadenfreude of the jubilant "democratic" rabble, half-blood scum of big cities, sycophantic lumpen "The End of History", hastily announced by the overjoyed were the builders of the New World Order. Let our bloody banner be a constant threat to them.

This article was first published in the newspaper "Soviet Russia" in 1992 under the pseudonym Leonid Okhotin and later became the basis of the ideological platform of the revived Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov.
Kamran Heiss
User avatar
Soviet cogitations: 4484
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 07 Oct 2004, 22:04
Ideology: Marxism-Leninism
Resident Soviet
Post 29 Jul 2020, 16:15
Great article. I think Dugin's worldview shifted as the country transformed. In the late 80s and early 90s he was one of the relatively few voices on the etatist left who criticized Gorbachev and what came after him. You Russian friend is right though that his influence is extremely exaggerated in the West, probably for 'look at the Russian bogeyman seeking to conquer all of Europe' purposes.

Regarding Dugin's influence on the Communist Party, if anything I think they stopped listening to him sometime ago (or perhaps never did), as 'nostalgic restorationism' is basically one of their key points of their platforms. They did reject atheism and softened their position toward the 'middle class' as well, but it's not clear whether Dugin should be credited for that.
"The thing about capitalism is that it sounds awful on paper and is horrendous in practice. Communism sounds wonderful on paper and when it was put into practice it was done pretty well for what they had to work with." -MiG
User avatar
Soviet cogitations: 820
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 28 Jan 2008, 19:10
Ideology: Marxism-Leninism
Komsomol
Post 29 Jul 2020, 17:54
I see they also reposted an article from him as late as 2003, when he probably wasn't associated with them anymore which included lines like

"The KPRF is not a left-wing party."

"The Communist Party is not the ideological successor of the CPSU."

https://kprf.ru/personal/dugin/ideas/19532.html
Kamran Heiss
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