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WWII Military Deaths(Eastern Front)

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Soviet cogitations: 236
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 07 Jul 2012, 03:04
Ideology: None
Pioneer
Post 03 Oct 2012, 02:09
Can anyone direct me to a competent source for total military deaths in the Eastern Front during WWII? The only ones I've looked at thus far have been from Western sources. The thing is, they don't reflect the Soviet's grand strategy in the war, which was to exhaust the Germans by using buffers, until they were on "equal footing" with the Germans, which Ian Grey noted was calculated for 1943.
Loz
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Soviet cogitations: 11879
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 06 Dec 2009, 23:17
Philosophized
Post 03 Oct 2012, 02:59
EDIT:
The Russian Wikipedia isn't exactly clear about the casualties.

Quote:
The thing is, they don't reflect the Soviet's grand strategy in the war, which was to exhaust the Germans by using buffers, until they were on "equal footing" with the Germans, which Ian Grey noted was calculated for 1943.

What exactly are you talking about? Please elaborate.
I doubt that for example the Kiev pocket was a part of some "grand strategy" you bring up.
The Soviets didn't achieve numerical parity with the invading forces until about 1943 or so, because of the horrible losses in the first months of the war.
Last edited by Loz on 03 Oct 2012, 03:33, edited 2 times in total.
Loz
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Soviet cogitations: 11879
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 06 Dec 2009, 23:17
Philosophized
Post 03 Oct 2012, 03:30
What seems as the most realiable source is Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century ( Военные потери России и СССР в войнах XX века ) by G. Krivosheev:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grigoriy_Krivosheyev

You can find it on the Internet and read with Google Translate
Soviet cogitations: 236
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 07 Jul 2012, 03:04
Ideology: None
Pioneer
Post 03 Oct 2012, 03:45
Loz wrote:
What exactly are you talking about? Please elaborate.
I doubt that for example the Kiev pocket was a part of some "grand strategy" you bring up.
The Soviets didn't achieve numerical parity with the invading forces until about 1943 or so, because of the horrible losses in the first months of the war.


I was referring to the land East of the Curzon, the Baltic states, Karelia, and Bessarabia as buffers against a German invasion. By no means am I referring to greater Ukraine as a buffer state, and I'm sure the Soviets didn't intend for Greater Ukraine to be captured.

As I read in Molotov Remembers, the Soviets had plans to invade Germany, in 1940, if there was a prolonged Franco-German war, but it only lasted for 6 weeks. At that point, he said the Soviets begun mobilizing for war, which he said they believed would start in 1942, seeing that a war in the East was inevitable.


I will have to review my copy later and extract quotes from it, which I will post on here when I have the time.

I posted this on another thread, which I will post here as well.

"He met uncertainty with ambiguity. He staked out the middle ground without indicating the direction in which he might move. Events would dictate... The one certainty remained his belief, rooted in Leninism, of the inevitability of war...

In the parallel negotiations with the Anglo-French and the Germans during the summer of 1939, Stalin's dual aim was to avoid being drawn into a war that he believed inevitable, and to ensure that if and when he became involved it would be under the most favourable political and military circumstances....

The Nazi-Soviet Pact did not, by contrast, involve a military alliance, and Stalin refused to conclude one with Germany over the following months. Its main advantages in Stalin's mind were to keep the Soviet Union out of the coming 'imperialist war' ... Given his assumption that the war in the West would be prolonged... Stalin envisaged gaining a necessary breathing space because 'only by 1943 could we meet the Germans on an equal footing.' ....

The fall of France shattered his illusions of a stalemate...

That Stalin was stupefied by the German attack in June 1941... [made him] the victim of self-deception based on a set of perfectly rational, if faulty, calculations. He was convinced that Hitler would never risk repeating the error of the Germans in the First World War of fighting on two fronts."
(Alfred J. Rieber, "Stalin as foreign policy-maker: avoiding war, 1927-1953" in Stalin: A New History. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp. 143, 146-147.)"
Soviet cogitations: 236
Defected to the U.S.S.R.: 07 Jul 2012, 03:04
Ideology: None
Pioneer
Post 03 Oct 2012, 04:16
"We knew the war was coming soon, that we were weaker than Germany, that we would have to retreat. The question was, retreat to where – to Smolensk or to Moscow, that’s what we discussed before the war. We knew we would have to retreat, and we needed as much territory as possible. We did everything to postpone the war. And we succeeded – for a year and ten months. We wished it could have been longer, of course. Stalin reckoned before the war that only in 1943 would we be able to meet the Germans as equals."
Chuev, Felix. Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics. p. 21.)
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