U.S.S.R. and communism historical discussion.
[ Login ] [ Active ]

The myth of the Ukrainian Holodomor

Log-in to remove advertisement.
Post 05 Mar 2014, 13:08
Let's put an end to this discussion with historical and indisputable evidences from Mark Tauger's works.


- The famine was due to collectivization and organized by Soviet power to subdue the countryside and strenghten Soviet rule.
- The famine was directed against the Ukrainian population.
- The famine was especially directed against the peasant population and the "kulaks" who refused collectivization.
- The USSR did nothing to stop the famine. People were starving from enormous grain procurements quotas.
- The USSR kept exporting grain even though people were starving.


"The low 1932 harvest meant that the regime did not have sufficient grain for urban and rural food supplies, seed, and exports. The authorities curtailed all of these, but ultimately rural food supplies had last priority. The harsh 1932-1933 procurements only displaces the famine from urban areas, which would have suffered a similar scale of mortality without grain the procurements provided (though, as noted above, urban mortality rates also rose in 1933). The serverity and geographical extent of the famine, the sharp decline in exports in 1932-1933, seed requirements, and the chaos in the Soviet Union in these years, all lead to the conclusion that even a complete cessation of exports would not have been enought to preven famine. This situation makes it difficult to accept the interpretation of the famine as the result of the 1932 grain procurements and as a conscious act of genocide. The harvest of 1932 essentially made a famine inevitable."


"The 1932 grain procurement quota, and the amount of grain actually collected, were both much smaller than those of any other year in the 1930s. The Central Committee lowered the planned procurement quota in a 6 May 1932 decree, which also permitted kolkhoz and peasant trade in grain at free market prices. To encourage increase production, this decree reduced grain procurement quotas for kolkhozy and edinolichniki from the 1931 quota of 22.4 million tons to 18.1 million tons; in partial compensation it raised the sovkhoz quota from 1.7 million tons to 2.5 million tons, for a total procurement quota of 20.6 million tons. Since the preliminary plan composed by the trade commissariat in December 1931 had set grain procurements at 29.5 million tons, the 6 MAY law actually reduced the procurement plan 30 percent. Subsequent decrees also reduced procurement quotas for most other agricultural products.
These decisions were a major policy shift from the preceeding years' attempt to eliminate market forces from the Soviet economy. After the May 1932 decree, Soviet leaders were optimistic that trade by kolkhozy and individual peasants would become as important for urban food supplies as procurements. Local officials and outside observers even saw the decree as a new NEP.


- "A former Belorussian kolkhoznik has stated that Belorrussia was also struck by famine. A Soviet specialist on the Volga region wrote of "significant provisioning difficulties" during 1931-1933, a Soviet author who lived in a village near Saratov in the early 1930s writes of mass starvation deaths there. The British Embassy received reports of massive resistance to grain procurements in Novosibirsk. A Canadian agricultural specialist, Andrew Cairns, who toured most of the primary grain regions in summer 1932, was accosted in the SIberian town of Slavgorod by crows of people who told him that villages were empty and people were starving to death every day in the countryside."


"A recent study of Dneprostroi notes that while the 1932-1933 famine affected the countryside more than the towns, nonetheless "Even there it was devastating to the health of the population." Bread rations steadily declined and were not given out in full, workers had to leave work to stand in long bread lines, and typhus, tuberculosis, and smallpox became widespread. Reports from several Soviet cities in the émigré Menshevik press indicated that food prices increased far beyond workers' salaries during 1932. Blue-collar and white-collar workers were selling everything they owned to buy bread, theft was rampant, and no one saw any prospects for improvement."


- "Archival evidence of low yields and the gabs between archival and official data lead to the conclusion that the authorities lowered crop estimates and moderated procurement demands in response to the low harvest.

- "They did try to alleviate the famine. A 25 February 1933 Central Committee decree allotted seed loans of 320,000 tons to Ukraine and 240,000 tons to the northern Caucasus, Seed loans were also made to the Lower Volga and may have been made to other regions as well. Kul'chyts'kyy cites Ukrainian party archives showing that total aid to Ukraine by April 1933 actually exceeded 560,000 tons, including more than 80,000 tons of food. Aid to Ukraine alone was 60 percent greater than the amount exported during the same period. Total aid to famine regions was more than double exports for the first half of 1933. It appeas to have been another consequence of the low 1932 harvest that more aid was not provided: After the low 1931, and 1934, and 1936 harvests procured grain was transferred back to peasants at the expense of exports."


"The food shortages and their effects heigtened party opposition to the Stalinist leadership. According to Boris Ncolaevsky, by 1932 spreading famine and consequent declining labor productivity led to the emergence of an "anti-Stalin majority" in the Politburo that produced the Riutin platform and other opposition programs. Party members and government officials were disaffected by the shortages and the 1932 procurement campaign. To suppress this, the regime initiated a harsh purge in the norther Caucasus and Ukraine in late 1932 and extended it to the rest of the country the following year."


"The harvest decline also decreased the regime's reserves of grain export. This drop in reserves began with the dought-reduced 1931 harvest and subsequent procurements, which procured grain to those areas in 1932. The low 1931 harvest and reallocations of grain to famine areas forced the regime to curtain grain exports from 5.2 million tons in 1931 to 1.73 million in 1932; they declined to 1.68 million in 1933. Grain exported in 1932 and 1933 could have fed many people and reduced the famine: The 354,000 tons exported in the first half of 1933, for example, could have provided nearly 2 million people with daily rations of 1 kilogram for six months. Yet these exports were less than half of the 750,000 tons exported in the first half of 1932. How Soviet leaders calculated the relative costs of lower exports and lower domestic food supplies remains uncertain, but available evidence indicates that further reductions or cessation of Soviet exports could have had serious consequences. Grain prices fell in world markets and turned the terms of trade against the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, its indebtedness rose and its potential ability to pay declined, causing western bankers and officials to consider seizure of Soviet property abroad and denial of future credits in case of Soviet default. Failure to export thus would have threatened the fulfillment of its industrialization plans and, according to some observers, the stability of the regime.",%20%27The%201932%20Harvest%20and%20the%20Famine%20of%201933,%20SR%2091.pdf
Post 05 Mar 2014, 16:03
Nice work Comrade!

Now all we need to do is ram these facts down the throat of those indoctrinated with.Hearst Bullshit.

Not an easy task but worthwhile none the less.
Post 05 Mar 2014, 18:47
The famine was caused by collectivization, which killed efficiency. Its not surprising that present-day Russia produces more than the Russian SFSR, and that Ukraine twice as much as the Ukrainian SSR. Collectivization didn't work.. Of course, neither did private ownership either under communism - In Poland the lands were owned privately, but the system was still inefficient. The wage structure is probably to blame, or something rather more complexed (such as following five-year plans)..
Post 05 Mar 2014, 20:51
Lol, I write something that proves that the famine wasn't due to collectivization, and you say "famine was caused by collectivization" without any kind of evidence. If you are just there to repeat your dogmas, It's useless to discuss. Soviet grain production has been discussed there:

"Ukraine twice as much as the Ukrainian SSR"

"The sudden loss of State agricultural subsidies had an enormous effect on every aspect of Ukrainian agriculture. The contraction in livestock inventories that had begun in the late 1980's continued and intensified. Fertilizer use fell by 85 percent over a ten-year period, and grain production by 50 percent"


Oooh looks like they collectivized again in 2003! What was the name of the stalinist who did that?
Post 07 Mar 2014, 09:42
I'll be honest here, how many sources say otherwise? Do the majority say so, or only some? The majority say it was due to collectivization or Stalin. This is a fringe theory, and the author admits it himself
Post 07 Mar 2014, 14:33
Even if all sources said that, how would that make those sources right? Number doesn't make you right, only facts, argumentation, and when it comes to history, archive evidences. You way of thinking is unscientific. Mark Tauger is a serious historian and his work is very good, he gives actual evidences from Russian and Ukrainian archives. The 1932-1933 famine couldn't have been caused by collectivization because, as Mark Tauger shows, Soviet Policies in 1932 were exactly the contrary of collectivization and more like a new NEP.

Moreover, Mark Tauger proves that collectivization even helped to alleviate the famine. Indeed, you have to imagine the year 1932, people dying en masse (at least according to anticommunist sources), especially peasants. Some anticommunists even said 5 millions! Can you imagine that, five millions, and probably much more persons suffering from illnesses (because obviously most people died from illness and not directly from hunger). Even if we suppose that tens of thousands, and not millions, died, that would be a lot. So in this year 1932, they were dying, yet they managed to produce for the next year, and indeed the 1933 crop was quite good. Mark Tauger proves that this was due to collectivization policies, particularly mechanization.
Post 15 Mar 2014, 01:18
Soviet Policies in 1932 were exactly the contrary of collectivization and more like a new NEP.

Um, so how does this make Stalin a negation of the 'super-industrialist' left-opposition? Collectivization was supposed to be their implemented plans, albeit harshly and rapidly.
Post 15 Mar 2014, 11:34
What do you mean exactly? You can collectivize rapidly but make a short break, and that's what they did in 1932 I guess.
Post 19 Apr 2014, 03:09
"The majority say it was due to collectivization or Stalin."

Argumentum ad Numeram.
More Forums: The History Forum. The UK Politics Forum.
© 2000- Privacy.
[ Top ]